Kentucky Law Survey: Torts by Ausness, Richard C.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 64 | Issue 2 Article 2
1975
Kentucky Law Survey: Torts
Richard C. Ausness
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Special Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law
Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ausness, Richard C. (1975) "Kentucky Law Survey: Torts," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 64 : Iss. 2 , Article 2.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol64/iss2/2
Torts
By RICHARD C. AUSNESS*
INTRODUCTION
During the past term the Kentucky Court of Appeals was
quite active in the area of torts. The Court considered cases
involving battery,' nuisance,2 products liability and negligence.
The negligence decisions dealt with a defendant's standard of
care, 3 contributory negligence4 and last clear chance.5 Four of
these cases have been selected for examination in this article.
I. NEGLIGENCE
A. Proximate Cause
In House v. Kellerman' the plaintiff's wife was killed when
an automobile in which she was a passenger went out of control
and was struck by the defendant's vehicle.7 The car began to
skid while proceeding southward along an interstate highway,
and the decedent, who had been asleep, awoke and grabbed the
driver's right arm, causing him to lose control of the automo-
bile. While out of control, the automobile was struck by the
defendant's car which was traveling in the same direction.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1966, J.D. 1968, Uni-
versity of Florida; LL.M. 1973, Yale University.
I See Board v. Humes, No. V-183-72 (Ky., Jan. 31, 1975).
2 See Taylor v. Carrico, 528 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1975).
See Compton v. Johnson, 522 S.W.2d 448 (Ky. 1975); M & T Chem. Inc. v.
Westrick, 525 S.W.2d 740 (Ky. 1975); Knight v. George Ryan Co., Inc., 516 S.W.2d
848 (Ky. 1975); Johnson v. Draime, No. 73-105 (Ky., Jan. 31, 1975)(malpractice);
Monarch Warehouse Co. v. Major Breckenridge Corp., 518 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. 1975)(bai-
lee); Moore v. Louisville Transit Co., No. 73-51 (Ky., Feb. 21, 1975)(common carrier);
Johnson v. Haddix, 522 S.W.2d 859 (Ky. 1975)(violation of statute).
I See Daniels v. Kerschner, 519 S.W.2d 386 (Ky. 1975); Allen v. Arnett, 525
S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1975); Boss v. Pierce, No. F-32-72 (Ky., Feb. 7, 1975).
See Gaddie, Inc., v. Price, 528 S.W.2d 703 (Ky. 1975); Smith v. Wright, 512
S.W.2d 943 (Ky. 1974).
519 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1975).
'The decedent's unborn child was also killed. The husband, acting as administra-
tor of their estate and suing in his own right, brought this action against both drivers,
as well as against his own insurance company, under the uninsured motorist provisions
applicable to Mrs. Hill. After the trial the claims against Mrs. Hill and the plaintiff's
insurance company were settled, and the appeal was taken only against Kellerman.
Id. at 381.
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At trial the jury was instructed to find for the defendant
if it believed that the accident "was caused and brought about
solely by the decedent, Janice House, grabbing the arm of her
driver . . and thereby causing said automobile to go out of
control .... 18 The theory of this instruction apparently was
that although the decedent's action may not have been negli-
gent, it could have been an intervening cause,9 superseding the
negligence of the defendants. 0 Relying on this instruction, the
jury returned a verdict in favor of both defendants.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the jury in-
struction was erroneous and prejudicial to the plaintiff." Ac-
cording to the Court:
An instruction telling the jury that if the accident resulted
from a cause for which a party was not responsible it shall
find for the defendant is needless, because it has been in-
structed elsewhere that it shall find against him only if it
believes from the evidence that the cause was one for which
he was responsible. And it is prejudicial because it gives
undue emphasis to the evidence on which the defendant re-
lies in contending that his fault, if any, was not a legal
cause. 2
The Court also pointed out that any instruction on superseding
cause was inappropriate in this case because the decedent's
action occurred before the defendant's negligent act, and,
therefore, could not be an intervening force.
The most significant aspect of House v. Kellerman, how-
ever, was the Court's ruling that questions of superseding cause
should be treated as legal issues for the court instead of ques-
tions of fact for the jury. As the Court acknowledged, this posi-
tion is contrary to prior Kentucky decisions 3 and the weight of
'Id.
An intervening cause is one which actively operates to produce the plaintiff's
injury after the defendant's negligent act or omission has occurred. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) oF ToRTs § 441 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
11 A superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force which by its
intervention prevents the defendant from being liable for the harm caused by his
antecedent negligence. RESTATEMENT § 440.
" See also Wooten v. Legate, 519 S.W.2d 385 (Ky. 1975), in which the court held
that an instruction on the theory of unavoidable accident was improper and prejudicial
to the plaintiff.
22 519 S.W.2d at 382.
'3 See State Contracting & Stone Co. v. Fulkerson, 288 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. 1956);
[Vol. 64
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authority nationally. Consequently, the decision raises a seri-
ous question about the respective roles of judge and jury in the
trial of a negligence case and suggests the need for a re-
examination of the theory of proximate cause in Kentucky.
Proximate cause has been described as one of the most
imprecise and confusing concepts in the law of torts.'4 This is
due in part to a fusion of two distinct issues in the traditional
proximate cause formula: (1) The factual question of whether
the defendant's conduct was sufficiently connected with the
plaintiff's injury to be regarded as an actual cause of it; and
(2) the liability question of whether, under the circumstances,
the defendant should be held liable for the injury caused by a
breach of his duty of care. 5
Let us first consider cause-in-fact. In Mahan v. Able'6 the
Court declared: "To constitute proximate cause, an act must
be such that it induces an accident and without which the
accident would not have occurred." 7 This language is a version
of the "but for" or "sine qua non" test of cause-in-fact.'8 Under
Clardy v. Robinson, 284 S.W.2d 651 (Ky. 1955); Routzahn v. Bronen Hotel, 211 S.W.2d
848 (Ky. 1948).
" See Green, Jury Trial and Proximate Cause, 35 TEx. L. REV. 357, 358 (1957).
See Note, Causation, Duty and Negligence-Some Recent Developments in Ore-
gon Law, 45 ORE. L. REV. 124, 124-25 (1966).
16 251 S.W.2d 994 (Ky. 1952). See also Gerebenics v. Gaillard, 338 S.W.2d 216 (Ky.
1960); Berry v. Jorris, 199 S.W.2d 616 (Ky. 1947).
, 251 S.W.2d at 997.
" The "but for" or "sine qua non" rule is the most common test of cause-in-fact.
Under this approach the defendant's conduct is not considered a cause of the plaintiff's
injury if the harm would have occurred anyway. See Gerebenics v. Gaillard, 338
S.W.2d 216 (Ky. 1960); Mahan v. Able, 251 S.W.2d 994 (Ky. 1952). The "but for" test,
however, has been criticized, particularly where the defendant's conduct involved an
omission rather than an affirmative act. See Green, The Causal Relation Issue in
Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543, 556 (1962); Thode, The Indefensible Use of the
Hypothetical Case to Determine Cause-in-Fact, 46 TEx. L. REv. 423, 431-33 (1968).
See, e.g., Ford v. Trident Fisheries Co., 122 N.E. 399 (Mass. 1919)(failure to provide
lifeboat); Weeks v. McNulty, 48 S.W. 809 (Tenn. 1898)(failure to provide fire escape);
Stacy v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 54 N.W. 1091 (Wis. 1893)(failure to place fence around
hole in ice). In such cases, the jury is forced to speculate about what might have
happened rather than what in fact did happen. This situation arose in Texas & Pa.
Ry. v. McCleery, 418 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. 1967) and provoked a series of articles on the
hypothetical case aspects of the "but for" test. See Henderson, A Defense to the Use
of The Hypothetical Case to Resolve the Causation Issue - The Need for an
Expanded, Rather Than a Contracted Analysis, 47 TEx. L. REV. 183 (1969); Thode, A
Reply to the Defense of the Use of the Hypothetical Case to Resolve the Causation
Issue, 47 TEx. L. REV. 1344 (1969); Thode, The Indefensible Use of the Hypothetical
19751
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this rule, or the somewhat broader "substantial factor" test,'9
the existence of a causal relationship between the defendant's
negligence and the plaintiff's injury is largely, although not
entirely, a question of fact"0 and may properly be submitted to
the jury.
The liability aspect of proximate cause has proven to be
more troublesome than cause-in-fact. Over the years, the Ken-
tucky Court has used a variety of tests more or less inter-
changeably in dealing with the liability question. Each of these
approaches represents a different theory about the way in
which liability for negligent acts should be determined.
In Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Stevens,2' the Court
held: "Proximate cause may be defined as that which, in a
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new cause,
produces an event. ' 22 This is an example of the direct causation
test, which was once very popular and which is still followed
Case to Determine Cause-in-Fact, 46 TEx. L. REV. 423 (1968). Dissatisfaction with this
approach has led Professor Leon Green to conclude that the test of cause in fact should
be simply whether the defendant's negligence "contributed to" the plaintiff's injuries.
See also Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 942, 958 (1965).
" The "but for" test is completely unsatisfactory when two independent forces
combine to produce a result which either alone would have produced. In such cases
most courts employ the substantial factor test, which provides that the defendant's
conduct will be regarded as a cause of the event if it was a material element and a
substantial factor in bringing it about. See Anderson v. Minneapolis, 179 N.W. 45
(Minn. 1920); Carney v. Goodman, 270 S.W.2d 572 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954); Walton v.
Blavert, 40 N.W.2d 545 (Wis. 1949); James & Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761,
762-63 (1951); Smith, Legal Cause of Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 103, 223, 229
(1911). Although originally intended as a test for both cause-in-fact and proximate
cause, the substantial factor test is now largely confined to the cause-in-fact issue. See
2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 20.6(6) (1956). The substantial factor
test has been criticized as vague. See H. HART & A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW
216-18, 263-66 (1959). However, one commentator has suggested that it is less mechani-
cal than the "but for" test and should be used in place of it more often. See Malone,
Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 91, 96-97 (1956). The RESTATEMENT
§ 432(2) restricts the substantial factor test to situations where the force set in motion
by the defendant would alone have been sufficient to produce the damage.
2 See Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543,
549 (1962). However, the significance of this distinction has been questioned. See
Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 97 (1956); Probert,
Causation in the Negligence Jargon: A Plea for Balanced "Realism," 18 U. FLA. L. REV.
369, 377 (1965).
21 182 S.W.2d 447 (1944). See also Morris v. Combs' Adm'r, 200 S.W.2d 281 (Ky.
1947); Paducah Traction Co. v. Weitlauf, 195 S.W. 99 (Ky. 1917); City of Louisville v.
Hart's Adm'r, 136 S.W. 212 (Ky. 1911).
2 182 S.W.2d at 454.
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in a number of states.23 It resolves the liability issue by impos-
ing liability on the defendant for any injury that was a direct
consequence of his negligent act, regardless of the foreseeability
of the nature or extent of the injury.24 At first blush, the direct
causation rule appears easy to apply, but as its critics point
out, this rather mechanical approach deprives the court of its
legitimate role in determining liability.
25
Another approach was utilized in Hewitt's Administrator
v. Central Truckaway System, 2 where the Court stated: "To
constitute 'proximate cause' creating liability for negligence,
the injury must have been a natural and probable consequence
of the negligent act. ' ' 2 To this definition Eaton v. Louisville &
Nashville Railroad Co. 2 added: "For negligence to constitute
the 'proximate cause' of an injury, the injury must be . . . of
such a character as an ordinarily prudent person should have
foreseen might probably occur as a result of negligence, but the
negligent person need not have foreseen the precise form of the
injury. "29
The Hewitt decision attempts to limit the defendant's lia-
bility to the "natural and probable consequences" of his act.
3
1
Although this test is somewhat mechanical, the vagueness of
such terms as "natural" and "probable" provides considerable
latitude to the decision-maker. The natural and probable con-
sequences test also contains a hint of the foreseeability stan-
dard and is often regarded as a variant of the "foreseeable
23 See, e.g., Chenoweth v. Flynn, 99 N.W.2d 310 (Iowa 1959); Dellwo v. Pearson,
107 N.W.2d 859 (Minn. 1961); Thompson v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 144 A.2d
786 (Vt. 1958); Strahlendorf v. Walgreen Co., 114 N.W.2d 823 (Wis. 1962).
24 See R. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 28-36 (1963); Myers,
Causation and Common Sense, 5 MIAM L.Q. 238, 242-45 (1951). However, when there
are intervening forces the defendant is liable only for that harm which occurs within
the risk that his conduct created. See Nunan v. Bennett, 212 S.W. 570 (Ky. 1919); 57
AM. JuR. 2d, Negligence § 203 (1971).
2 See Prosser, Palsgraf Revisted, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1, 25-27 (1953).
26 194 S.W.2d 999 (Ky. 1946). See also Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dep't of Highways,
479 S.W.2d 603 (Ky. 1972); Dick v. Higgason, 322 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. 1959).
194 S.W.2d at 1001.
2 259 S.W.2d 29 (Ky. 1953).
22 Id. at 31.
See also Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Maddox, 183 So. 849 (Ala. 1938);
Seith v. Commonwealth Elec. Co., 89 N.E. 425 (Ill. 1909); West v. Ward, 42 N.W. 309
(Iowa 1889); Hall v. Cable Dairies, Inc., 67 S.E.2d 63 (N.C. 1951).
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consequences" test.1
The language in Eaton is more typical of the foreseeable
consequences rule. This approach, which is followed in many
states,32 purports to limit the defendant's liability to those con-
sequences which were reasonably foreseeable at the time of the
negligent act. This would appear to expose a negligent defen-
dant to less liability than the direct causation rule exemplified
by the Stevens case. However, such a conclusion must be quali-
fied, since, as the court in Eaton observed, the precise injury
need not be foreseen in order to hold the defendant liable.
3
This, of course, gives the decision-maker a great deal of leeway,
for resolution of the liability issue depends on the degree of
particularity with which the judge or jury defines the reasona-
bly foreseeable consequences. 4
Foreseeability, at least in theory, is especially important
where the defendant's negligent act only indirectly causes or
contributes to the plaintiff's injury. As the Court in Hines v.
Westerfield35 declared:
If the original negligent act set in force a chain of events
which the original negligent actor might have reasonably
foreseen would, according to the experience of mankind, lead
to the event which happened, the original actor is not relieved
of liability by the intervening act. If, however, the ultimate
injury is brought about by an intervening act or force so unu-
sual as not to have been reasonably foreseeable, the interven-
ing act is considered as the superseding cause and the original
actor is not liable.
3 6
In fact, the Kentucky Court of Appeals has held the original
actor liable when such intervening forces as lightning, 37 dis-
1, See Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 942, 974-81 (1965). The natural and probable conse-
quences test, however, can also be interpreted as a hindsight test. See R. KEETON,
LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 27 (1963).
32 See, e.g., Phares v. Carr, 106 N.E.2d 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 1952); Phillips v.
Stockman, 351 S.W.2d 464 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); Hopson v. Gulf Oil Corp., 237 S.W.2d
352 (Tex. 1951); Miller v. Bolyard, 97 S.E.2d 58 (W. Va. 1957).
1 See also Rich v. Finley, 89 N.E.2d 213 (Mass. 1949); Mrazek v. Terminal Ry.
Ass'n, 111 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1937).
31 See J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 421 (1975).
254 S.W.2d 728 (Ky. 1953).
3' Id. at 729.
3' See Clark's Adm'r v. Kentucky Util. Co., 158 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. 1942).
[Vol. 64
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ease,3 or the innocent acts of the victim 39 or a third person"
contributed to the plaintiff's injury on the theory that such
forces were foreseeable.' Even intervening negligent conduct,
when reasonably foreseeable, will not relieve the first tortfeasor
from liability. Thus, in Miles v. Southeastern Motor Truck
Lines12 the defendant, whose negligent driving caused a truck
to overturn, was held liable for an explosion caused by the
negligence of a bystander who was smoking within 20 feet of the
overturned truck's fuel tank. In Roberts v. Taylor 3 the defen-
dant motorist negligently struck a child; while the victim was
lying unconscious in the street, she was run over by a second
driver. This intervening act was considered foreseeable, and
the original defendant was held liable for all of the plaintiff's
injuries. The Court has also regarded subsequent improper
medical treatment" and a second accident45 as sufficiently fore-
seeable to hold the original tort-feasor liable for injuries caused
by such intervening forces. On the other hand, in Dixon v.
Kentucky Utilities Co.," the intervening negligence of a motor-
ist who struck the defendant's utility pole, which in turn elec-
trocuted a small child, was treated as a superseding force.
Since intervening criminal or intentionally tortious acts
are seldom foreseeable, the Kentucky Court has usually treated
them as superseding causes.17 Nevertheless, in University of
Louisville v. Hammock s the Court allowed the plaintiff, a pa-
tient at the defendant's infirmary, to recover for injuries re-
ceived when she was attacked by a patient who was afflicted
with delirium tremens. In Miller v. Mills,49 the plaintiff, a pas-
- See Hazelwood v. Hodge, 357 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. 1961). But see Bush v. Common-
wealth, 78 Ky. 268 (1880).
11 See, e.g., Mackey v. Spradlin, 397 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1965); Louisville & Nashville
R.R. v. Stevens, 182 S.W. 2d 447 (Ky. 1944); Newton v. Wetherby's Adm'x, 153 S.W.2d
947 (Ky. 1941).
See Lexington Country Club v. Stevenson, 390 S.W.2d 137 (Ky. 1965).
" But see Newton v. Wetherby's Adm'x, 153 S.W.2d 947 (Ky. 1941).
42 173 S.W.2d 990 (Ky. 1943).
43 339 S.W.2d 653 (Ky. 1960).
See City of Covington v. Keal, 133 S.W.2d 49 (Ky. 1939).
' See Eichstadt v. Underwood, 337 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1960).
174 S.W.2d 19 (Ky. 1943).
" See Watson v. Kentucky & Ind. Bridge & R.R. Co., 126 S.W. 146 (Ky. 1910).
106 S.W. 219 (Ky. 1907).
4' 257 S.W.2d 520 (Ky. 1953).
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senger on the defendant's bus, got out of the bus to watch a
fight between the bus driver and two intoxicated non-
passengers and was struck in the head by a whiskey bottle
thrown by one of the driver's adversaries. The Court held for
the plaintiff against the bus company, after declaring that
harm to the passengers resulting from the fight was foreseeable.
As these cases show, a foreseeability rule, if not taken too
literally, will usually work relatively well in practice, even
though rather unlikely events are occasionally characterized as
"foreseeable." The liability issue, however, may often require
a court to consider factors other than foreseeability. The fore-
seeable consequences rule is analytically deficient because it
may prevent a court from explicitly considering other relevant
policy matters in deciding the liability issue. It also confuses
the role of judge and jury when it transforms questions of law
(liability) into questions of fact (foreseeability).
Dissatisfaction with these and other aspects of the proxi-
mate cause analysis has led some commentators to advocate
the "risk theory," a new approach to the liability issue which
separates causation and liability." Under the risk theory, caus-
ation is limited to cause-in-fact, while the liability issue is
treated as a duty problem. This theory is based on the notion
that duty and negligence are relational, and that the plaintiff
may recover only if the defendant breached a duty which was
owed to him.5' Most proponents of the risk theory argue that
the scope of liability should be coterminous with the hazard
created, that the injury should be within the risk, and that the
defendant should be held liable only if his negligence created
an unreasonable risk with respect to the plaintiff.52 While this
theory appears to be analytically superior to the traditional
concept of proximate cause, it still subjects the liability issue
to a foreseeability standard.
11 See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 43 (4th ed. 1971); Seavey,
Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARV. L. REV. 372, 381-91 (1939); Note, Impact of
the Risk Theory on the Law of Negligence, 63 HARV. L. REV. 671 (1950). The risk theory
is said to have originated in Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.
Co., 169 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
See Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARV. L. REV. 72 (1942).
52 See Note, The Risk Theory and Proximate Cause-A Comparative Study, 32
NEB. L. REV. 72, 73 (1952).
[Vol. 64
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The approach advocated by Leon Green and his followers
also assumes that the liability issue in a negligence case is best
decided as a scope of duty question . 3 According to Green, the
plaintiff should recover only if four criteria are met: (1) The
plaintiff must show a causal relationship between the defen-
dant's conduct and his injury (the causation issue); (2) he must
also prove the injuries that he has suffered (the damages issue);
(3) there must be a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant
concerning the risk involved (the duty issue); and (4) the defen-
dant must have violated his duty (the negligence issue)."
Causation, negligence and damages are jury issues,55 and
since foreseeability is treated as part of the negligence issue, it
too remains within the purview of the jury. According to Green,
breach of duty involves subjecting the plaintiff to an unreason-
able risk, an issue which requires evaluation of the defendant's
conduct in light of foreseeable harm to the plaintiff or others
in the same class.
Duty, on the other hand, involves policy considerations
and is a question of law. 6 In many cases the scope of the defen-
dant's duty will already be known from former decisions or
statutes, but where there is no controlling legal rule the court
must make new law. This involves not the foresight of the
defendant, but the hindsight of the court-hindsight that may
involve policy considerations extending beyond the interests of
the immediate litigants. 57 When an intervening force is in-
volved, the court must determine whether the defendant owed
the plaintiff a duty to protect him from the intervening cause
of his injuries.
58
Although House v. Kellerman did not depart from the tra-
ditional proximate cause analysis, the Court's holding is not
"' See generally L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930); L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXI-
MATE CAUSE (1927); Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401
(1961); Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014 (1929).
51 See Green, Jury Trial and Proximate Cause, 35 TEx. L. REV. 357, 359 (1957).
5 See Note, Causation, Duty and Negligence: Some Recent Developments in
Oregon Law, 45 ORE. L. REV. 124, 126 (1966).
11 See Green, The Casual Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REv. 543,
562 (1962).
"7 See Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401, 1418
(1961).
11 See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES. LAW OF TORTS § 20.5(5) (1956).
1975]
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inconsistent with the Green approach. If the issue of supersed-
ing cause is taken away from the jury, a duty-oriented hind-
sight approach may be better suited to the court's role in the
litigation process than the foreseeability-oriented approach
that is presently utilized. Liability will remain a difficult issue,
whether viewed from a proximate cause or a duty perspective.
The approach suggested here will not perform miracles, but it
may clarify matters by isolating the liability issue from the
other constituents of a negligence cause of action and delineat-
ing the respective functions of judge and jury.
B. The Family Purpose Doctrine
In Keeney v. Smith59 the Court of Appeals recently reex-
amined the family purpose doctrine, under which the owner of
a motor vehicle maintained for family use is liable for injuries
caused by its negligent operation when it is driven by a family
member for a family purpose. 0 The doctrine requires: (1) own-
ership of the automobile by the defendant against whom vicari-
ous liability is sought;61 (2) designation of the automobile as a
family vehicle;6 2 (3) status of the driver as a family member; 3
(4) use of the automobile for a family purpose;" and (5) use of
' 521 S.W.2d 242 (Ky. 1975).
See generally 6 D. BLASHFIELD, AUTOMOBILE LAW & PRACTICE, §§ 255.21-255.32
(3d ed. 1966); 1 B L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY, AUTOMOBILES §
1.11[31 (1974); Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1911 (1966); 8 AM. JUR.2d, Automobiles and High-
way Traffic § 588 (1963).
" See Elliott v. Killian, 87 S.E.2d 903 (N.C. 1955); Jerdal v. Sinclair, 342 P.2d
585 (Wash. 1959). Actual or constructive ownership of the vehicle has been considered
unnecessary in some cases when the parent had control over the use of the car. See,
e.g., Chappell v. Dean, 128 S.E.2d 830 (N.C. 1963).
62 See Ferguson v. Gurley, 127 S.E.2d 642 (Ga. 1962); Daniel v. Patrick, 333
S.W.2d 504 (Ky. 1960).
9 Some cases have held the family purpose doctrine to be applicable even though
the driver at the time of the accident was a third party and not a family member. See,
e.g., Myrick v. Alexander, 112 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1960); Driver v. Smitt, 339 S.W.2d 135
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1959). This appears to be the rule in Kentucky. See Daniel v. Patrick,
333 S.W.2d 504 (Ky. 1960).
61 About half of the family purpose jurisdictions hold that a child who drives for
his own pleasure is not furthering a "family" purpose and is, therefore, not within the
scope of the doctrine. See, e.g., Hildock v. Grosso, 5 A.2d 565 (Pa. 1939); Sare v. Stetz,
214 P.2d 486 (Wyo. 1950). The remainder take the opposite view. See, e.g., Boyd v.
Close, 257 P. 1079 (Colo. 1927); Stevens v. Van Deusen, 241 P.2d 331 (N.M. 1951); Reid
v. Swindler, 154 S.E.2d 910 (S.C. 1967). Kentucky adheres to the latter position. See
Stowe v. Morris, 144 S.W. 52 (Ky. 1912).
[Vol. 64
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the automobile with the owner's permission." The family pur-
pose doctrine is followed in 14 states" but has been rejected in
32 jurisdictions.7
The family purpose doctrine is grounded in the agency
principle that one who furnishes a car for the use of his family
may be held liable as a "master," under the theory of
respondeat superior, when a family member causes injury
while using the automobile for "family business."68 This con-
ceptualization has been often criticized, however, because a
family member's negligent use of the car for his own benefit or
pleasure can constitute the requisite "family business," render-
ing the owner liable. This result is incompatible with the
agency law principle that an agent must act for his principal's
bjenefit in order for the principal to be held vicariously liable.69
c See 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 433(4)(b) (1969).
See Mortensen v. Knight, 305 P.2d 463 (Ariz. 1956); Appelhaus v. Kirkwood,
365 P.2d 233 (Colo. 1961); Silverman v. Silverman, 145 A.2d 826 (Conn. 1958); Fergu-
son v. Gurley, 127 S.E.2d 462 (Ga. 1962); Stowe v. Morris, 144 S.W. 52 (Ky. 1912);
Stevens v. Luther, 180 N.W. 87 (Neb. 1920); Burkhart v. Corn, 284 P.2d 226 (N.M.
1955); Altman v. Sanders, 148 S.E.2d 21 (N.C. 1966); Grenz v. Werre, 129 N.W.2d 681
(N.D. 1964); Norwood v. Parthomos, 95 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 1956); King v. Smythe, 204
S.W. 296 (Tenn. 1918); Jerdel v. Sinclair, 342 P.2d 587 (Wash. 1959); Eagon v. Woo-
lard, 11 S.E.2d 257 (W. Va. 1940).
1' See Winfrey v. Austin, 71 So. 2d 15 (Ala. 1954); Bieker v. Owens, 350 S.W.2d
522 (Ark. 1961); Spence v. Fisher, 193 P.255 (Cal. 1920); Smith v. Callahan, 144 A. 46
(Del. 1928); Gordon v. Rose, 33 P.2d 351 (Idaho 1934); Schuth v. Kuntz, 105 N.E.2d
523 (Ill. Ct. App. 1952); Smith v. Weaver, 124 N.E. 503 (Ind. Ct. App. 1919); McMortin
v. Saemisch, 116 N.E.2d 491 (Iowa 1962); Watkins v. Clark, 176 P. 131 (Kan. 1918);
Benton v. Griffith, 184 So. 371 (La. 1938); Robinson v. Warren, 151 A. 10 (Me. 1930);
Schneider v. Schneider, 152 A. 498 (Md. 1930); Dennis v. Glynn, 159 N.E. 516 (Mass.
1928); Shaler v. Reynolds, 104 N.W.2d 779 (Mich. 1960); Jacobson v. Dailey, 36
N.W.2d 711 (Minn. 1949); Dement v. Summer, 165 So. 791 (Miss. 1936); Mulanix v.
Reeves, 112 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938); Clawson v. Schroeder, 208 P. 924 (Mont.
1922); Grimes v. Labreck, 226 A.2d 787 (N.H. 1967); Schank v. Cernilia, 174 A. 739
(N.J. 1934); Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 115 N.E. 443 (N.Y. 1917); Wilson v. Herd, 204
N.E.2d 389 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965); Allen v. Hickman, 383 P.2d 676 (Okla. 1963); Haskey
v. Williams, 20 A.2d 32 (Pa. 1948); Zandry v. Richmond, 124 A. 263 (R.I. 1924);
Flanagan v. Slattery, 49 N.W.2d 27 (S.D. 1951); Seinheimer v. Burkhart, 122 S.W.2d
1063 (Tex. 1939); Reid v. Owens, 93 P.2d 680 (Utah 1939); Jones v. Knapp, 156 A. 399
(Vt. 1931); Hackley v. Robey, 195 S.E. 689 (Va. 1938); Burant v. Studzinski, 291 N.W.
390 (Wis. 1940); Stare v. Stetz, 214 P.2d 486 (Wyo. 1950).
" See Griffin v. Russell, 87 S.E. 10 (Ga. 1915); Davis v. Littlefield, 81 S.E. 487
(S.C. 1914); Birch v. Abercrombie, 133 P. 1020 (Wash. 1913).
11 See Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 115 N.E. 443, 445 (N.Y. 1917); Note, Family
Purpose Doctrine in Tennessee, 22 TENN. L. REV. 535, 536 (1952). See also Lattin,
Vicarious Liability and the Family Automobile, 26 MICH. L. REV. 846, 855-56 (1928).
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Consequently, many states which adhere to the family purpose
doctrine have abandoned the agency rationale and frankly ac-
knowledge that the doctrine is merely an instrument of policy
intended to place liability upon the party most easily held
responsible."0 In terms of social policy, the doctrine has been
justified as a means of encouraging owners to exercise greater
care in allowing family members to use their cars," and as a
method for fixing responsibility upon the one who is best able
to compensate a victim, either directly72 or through liability
insurance.
7 3
Kentucky first recognized the family purpose doctrine
more than 60 years ago in Stowe v. Morris.74 Although liability
was originally predicated on an agency theory,7 5 policy justifi-
cations for the doctrine have also received judicial recognition.
For example, in Turner v. Hall's Administratrix71 the Court
declared:
The Family Purpose Doctrine is a humanitarian one designed
for the protection of the public generally, and resulted from
recognition of the fact that in the vast majority of instances
an infant has not sufficient property in his own right to in-
demnify one who may suffer from his negligent act.
7 7
71 See Note, The Family Purpose Doctrine, 18 S.C.L. REV. 638, 639 (1966). "There
is obviously an element of unblushing fiction in this manufactured agency; and it has
quite often been recognized, without apology, that the doctrine is an instrument of
policy, a transparent device intended to place the liability upon the party most easily
held responsible." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ToRTs § 73 at 483 (4th ed.
1971).
" See King v. Smythe, 204 S.W. 296 (Tenn. 1918).
" See Hutchins v. Haffner, 167 P. 966 (Colo. 1917); Michaelsohn v. Smith, 113
N.W.2d 571 (N.C. 1962); Watson v. Burley, 143 S.E. 95 (W. Va. 1928); Annot., 8
A.L.R.3d 1191, 1205 (1966).
" See Note, Liability of the Owner of an Automobile for Its Negligent Use by a
Member of His Family, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 215 (1920).
71 144 S.W. 52 (Ky. 1912). Lashbrook v. Patten, 62 Ky. (1 Duv.) 317 (1864) is
sometimes cited as the origin of the family purpose doctrine in America. In that case
the Court held a father liable for the negligence of his minor son in connection with
transporting his sisters to a picnic.
, See, e.g., Steel v. Age's Adm'x, 26 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Ky. 1930); Sole v. Atkins,
276 S.W. 223 (Ky. 1924). The agency theory was criticized in Sampson, Liability of
the Owner of an Automobile for the Negligence of His Chauffeur and of His Family in
His Car, 14 Ky. L.J. 201, 212 (1926).
" 252 S.W.2d 30 (Ky. 1952). See also Richardson v. True, 259 S.W.2d 70, 71 (Ky.
1953); 48 Ky. L.J. 169, 171-72 (1959).
"1 252 S.W.2d at 32.
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Keeney v. Smith was an appeal from a judgment which
awarded damages to the plaintiff for injuries sustained in an
automobile collision. Liability had been imposed not only upon
the driver, but also upon the owner of the car, the driver's
father. At the time of the collision the negligent driver was
almost 19 years old, resided at home with his parents and at-
tended a local community college. Although he earned some
money by working on his father's farm, the younger Keeney
was not entirely self-supporting. The motor vehicle, a van reg-
istered in the father's name, was used primarily by the son for
transporting his horses to various horse shows.
The defendant-owner contended that the family purpose
doctrine should be restricted to situations in which the owner
has a legal duty to support the driver. The Court of Appeals
agreed and reversed the lower court's judgment. In effect, the
Court held that the doctrine was inapplicable to an adult child,
even when he resides with his parents and is dependent upon
them for support.
Many states apply the family purpose doctrine to adult as
well as minor children, under certain circumstances. 8 In such
states the controlling test is not whether the child is an adult
or a minor, or whether he is self-supporting, but whether he was
using the automobile for a family purpose with the consent of
the owner.79 This view, however, has been rejected in a few
states which have limited the family purpose doctrine to minor
or dependent children.
Until the Keeney decision, the status of the adult child
was uncertain in Kentucky.8' In Ludwig v. Johnson"2 the Court
had held that the family purpose doctrine was applicable only
where the owner was under a legal or moral obligation to sup-
'" See, e.g., Dunn v. Caylor, 127 S.E.2d 367 (Ga. 1962); Garska v. Harris, 109
N.W.2d 529 (Neb. 1961); Burkhart v. Corn, 284 P.2d 226 (N.M. 1955); Smith v.
Simpson, 133 S.E.2d 474 (N.C. 1963); Cockerham v. Potts, 20 P.2d 423 (Ore. 1933);
Watson v. Burley, 143 S.E. 95 (Va. 1928); Dillon v. Burnett, 85 P.2d 656 (Wash. 1938);
6 D. BLASHFIELD. AUTOMOBILE LAW & PRACTICE § 255.25 (3d ed. 1966).
7 See Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 1213 (1966).
' See, e.g., Adkins v. Nanney, 82 S.W.2d 867 (Tenn. 1935); Foran v. Kallio, 355
P.2d 544 (Wash. 1960).
" See Note, The Family Purpose Doctrine in Kentucky, 55 Ky. L.J. 502, 503-06
(1968).
-2 49 S.W.2d 347 (Ky. 1932).
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port the driver of the vehicle or where the driver was a minor
child of the owner.83 The Court did not indicate, however,
whether the age and obligation elements were both necessary.
Although in some Kentucky cases automobile owners have
been held liable for the negligence of their adult children,"'
liability was not based on the family purpose doctrine, but
upon conventional agency principles, since the child was
clearly acting for the benefit of the parent and not on his own
behalf.85 In no case prior to Keeney had the doctrine's applica-
bility depended solely upon the age of the driver."
The Court in Keeney noted that the General Assembly had
reduced the age of majority in Kentucky to 18 years 7 and con-
cluded that the father had no legal obligation to support his 19-
year-old son. Moreover, the Court rejected the plaintiff's con-
tention that the family purpose doctrine could be based on a
moral as well as a legal obligation, although there had been
dicta to that effect in earlier cases. In the Court's words:
No standards have ever been established for determining
what constitutes a moral obligation to support, and in our
view the term is so vague and indefinite as to defy any precise
application to the family purpose doctrine."
As a result of the Keeney decision, application of the fam-
ily purpose doctrine in the future will be limited to situations
in which the driver of the vehicle is a minor to whom the owner
owes a legal. obligation of support. A statute already provides
that the negligence of a driver under 18 years of age will be
imputed to the person who signs his application for an opera-
tor's license, to any motor vehicle owner who permits a child
under 18 to drive his automobile or to any one who gives or
" The Court's language was taken from dictum in an earlier family purpose case,
Bradley v. Schmidt, 4 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Ky. 1928). See also Walker v. Farley, 213
S.W.2d 1016, 1017 (Ky. 1948).
See Wireman v. Salyer, 336 S.W.2d 349 (Ky. 1960).
The adult child rule has often been confused with pure agency principles. This
may be due to the Court's tendency to employ agency language in family purpose
cases. See 55 Ky. L.J. 502, 505 (1968).
" Dicta in several cases, however, suggested that the family purpose doctrine
would not apply to an adult. See Abell v. Whitehead, 99 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. 1936);
Miracle v. Cavins, 72 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1934).
" Ky. REV. STAT. § 2.015 [hereinafter cited as KRS].
521 S.W.2d at 243.
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furnishes a motor vehicle to such a child."9 However, now that
the age of majority has been lowered to 18, accident victims
will be unable to recover against car owners for the negligence
of college students and other adult dependents. This leaves a
significant gap in the protection formerly afforded to accident
victims in this state.
The problem created by Keeney emphasizes the inade-
quacy of basing the family purpose doctrine on the driver's
status as a minor child. The legal obligation test, despite its
long acceptance in this state, should be rejected in favor of a
broader standard. Not only is the legal obligation test too nar-
row, but it seems to confuse the requirement of a family rela-
tionship with the requirement that the automobile be driven
for a family purpose. A family relationship is, of course, neces-
sary to sustain the concept of a family purpose and to establish
the agency status upon which the doctrine is based." However,
this requirement is satisfied if the driver lives with the family
and actually functions as a member of the household. Once the
family relationship is established, the existence of vicarious
liability should depend upon whether the parent has provided
a vehicle for the benefit of the family, and whether he has
retained control over its use by family members, including
adult children. In other words, the legal obligation test implies
that the parent's vicarious liability is based on his general abil-
ity to control the child's conduct, whereas it should depend on
his power to control the child's use of the motor vehicle in
question.
Despite its limitations, the family purpose doctrine repre-
sents a policy of placing the risk of injury by a financially
irresponsible driver on the owner of the automobile, rather than
on the injured victim. This choice is due primarily to a belief
that the owner is in a better position than the victim to spread
the loss through insurance. The effect of the Keeney decision
" KRS § 186.590. Similar legislation is found in other states: See, e.g., ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 75-315 (Supp. 1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21-6105 (1975); FLA. STAT. § 322.09
(1975); IDAHO CODE § 49-313 (Supp. 1975); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4507.07; Wis. STAT.
§ 343.15 (Supp. 1975); See also Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 1320 (1952); 8 Am. JUR.2d
Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 566 (1963).
See Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 1191, 1211 (1966).
g Those victims who drive can spread the risk by means of uninsured motorist
coverage under their own automobile liability insurance policies. 2 R. LONG, THE
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is to shift the risk back to the victim in some situations. Al-
though victims as a class have some capacity to spread the risk,
automobile owners can usually do so less expensively and more
effectively.
As was mentioned earlier, the family purpose doctrine is
primarily concerned with distributional goals. Its raison d'etre
is to compensate accident victims who are injured by finan-
cially irresponsible drivers. There are, however, other judicial
and legislative devices to achieve this objective.
9 2
For example, many states have enacted financial responsi-
bility laws and compulsory insurance provisions on the as-
sumption that drivers are the better loss-spreaders. Such laws
require drivers to carry liability insurance or otherwise demon-
strate a capacity to respond in damages if they cause an
accident. This approach is not entirely satisfactory because
the negligent driver is usually allowed one accident before he
must obtain the necessary insurance. 4 A few states, however,
require each driver to carry specified amounts of liability insur-
ance as a condition precedent to obtaining an operator's license
or registering a motor vehicle. 5 Although Kentucky enacted a
compulsory liability insurance provision as part of its recent
no-fault automobile insurance legislation,96 the act does not
include an effective enforcement mechanism.9
7
Other states place some of the risk on the owner as well as
the driver. For example, in some states automobile liability
LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE ch. 24 (1975); Note, Uninsured Motorist Coverage-
Charting the Kentucky Course, 62 Ky. L.J. 467 (1974). Some states have required
that such coverage be made available in all liability insurance contracts. See, e.g.,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1; ORE. REV. STAT. § 743.792.
92 See generally G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 39-67 (1970).
g1 For a discussion of financial responsibility laws see 12 G. CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF
INSURANCE LAW §§ 45:700 to 45:745 (2d ed. 1964); Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 1011 (1954).
11 See Laufer, Insurance Against Lack of Insurance, 1969 DUKE L.J. 227, 232;
Comment, The Financially Irresponsible Motorist, 10 VILL. L. REV. 545, 550 (1965).
11 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, §§ 1A-34A(1975); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF.
LAWS §§ 310-321 (1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-309 to 20-319 (1975).
95 KRS § 304.39-090, 304.39-110 (Supp. 1974). It appears that ovners and opera-
tors of motor vehicles must also purchase no-fault benefits, even if they decline to limit
their tort rights in return for no-fault coverage. See OFFICE OF CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION. REPORT OF THE SEMINAR ON No FAULT INSURANCE 100-02 (1974).
" One who fails to obtain the necessary liability insurance is subject to a fine of
$50 to $500. KRS § 304.99-050 (Supp. 1974). This appears to be the only means of
enforcement.
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insurance policies must include an omnibus clause of a
specified scope.9" This provision insures not only against the
negligence of the owner of the car, but also against that of any
person who has an accident while driving the automobile with
the owner's consent.99 Finally, legislation in a number of states
imposes liability on the owner for the negligence of the driver
where the vehicle is operated with the owner's consent.' 9 The
Florida courts have reached the same result by characterizing
the automobile as a "dangerous instrumentality" and thereby
holding the owner vicariously liable for the negligent acts of the
driver. 0'
Having restricted the scope of the family purpose doctrine,
Kentucky should adopt one of the alternatives discussed above
in order to more fairly distribute accident losses. Although each
of these proposals has strengths, as well as weaknesses, this
writer believes the last approach-a broad rule of vicarious
liability for automobile owners-would provide the greatest
protection for accident victims.
I. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Embs v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co.'0 2 involved the question
of whether manufacturers and sellers are strictly liable to "non-
users" for injuries caused by their defective products.' 3 Over
the years, liability for the manufacture and sale of defective
products has rested on negligence, warranty and strict liability
principles.'0 Originally, a defendant's tort liability was limited
See R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 4.7(a) (1971).
See Comment, Family Purpose Doctrine in Tennessee, 22 TENN. L. REv. 535,
543 (1952).
110 See 1B L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY, Automobiles § 1.11[2]
(1974); 8 AM. JUR 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 595-614 (1963).
"I See May v. Palm Beach Chem. Co., 77 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1955); Southern Cotton
Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629 (Fla. 1920); Note, The Dangerous Instrumentality
Doctrine: Unique Automobile Law in Florida, 5 U. FLA. L. REV. 412 (1952). Kentucky
rejected this approach in Mullen & Haynes Co. v. Crisp, 268 S.W. 576 (1925).
1.2 528 S.W.2d 703 (Ky. 1975).
10 See generally 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A[4]c
(1974); 1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4:25 (2d ed.
1974); Note, Strict Products Liability and the Bystander, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 916 (1964).
"01 See Ausness, From Caveat Emptor to Strict Liability: A Review of Products
Liability in Florida, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 410, 410-13 (1972).
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to those in privity with him,"' but since MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co. ,0 6 all states have abandoned this requirement in neg-
ligence actions."7 A second form of products liability, based on
implied warranty, arises by operation of law, regardless of the
seller's intention.' 8 Strict liability in tort, which was first pro-
posed in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,"'0 and which
has been incorporated into the Restatement of Torts,"' is now
accepted in most states,"' largely displacing the other theories
where personal injuries to users or consumers are involved."'
Although strict liability on behalf of users and consumers
is now well established, similar protection for nonusers has
developed more slowly. Part of the problem is conceptual. The
nonuser is outside the chain of distribution of the goods: "He
is not the man the supplier has sought to reach, and no implied
representation has been made to him that the product is safe
for use; nor has he relied upon any assurance of safety what-
ever.""' Nevertheless, nonusers may recover in negligence ac-
tions against the manufacturers, distributors and sellers of
defective products in cases where lack of due care can be
shown."' Liability to nonusers has also been allowed in some
jurisdictions under an implied warranty theory."5 However, the
,"5 See Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842); Stone v. Van Noy
R.R. News Co., 154 S.W. 1092 (Ky. 1913).
Ill11 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
,07 See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 96 (4th ed. 1971).
' See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960); Comment,
The Contractual Aspects of Consumer Protection: Recent Developments in the Law
of Sales Warranties, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1430 (1966).
z 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
11 RESTATEMENT § 402A (1965). See Keeton, Products Liability-The Nature and
Extent of Strict Liability, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 693; Wade, Strict Tort Liability of
Manufacturers, 19 S.W.L.J. 5 (1965).
"' See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966); Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057 (1967).
"I As to the relation between implied warranty and strict liability in tort, see
Dickerson, The ABC's of Products Liability-With a Close Look at Section 402A and
the Code, 36 TENN. L. REV. 439 (1969); Titus, Restatement (Second) Torts, Section
402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713 (1970).
115 Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN.
L. REV. 791, 819-20 (1966). See Comment, Cave Adstantem: Bystander Recovery in
Products Liability Cases, 2 CREIGHTON L. REV. 295, 295-96 (1969).
"I See Gall v. Union Ice Co., 239 P.2d 48 (Cal. App. 1951); Gaidry Motors, Inc.
v. Brannon, 268 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1953); McLeod v. Line Air Prods. Co., 1 S.W.2d 122
(Mo. 1927); See also RESTATEMENT § 395 (1965).
"I See Comment, Cave Adstantem: Bystander Recovery in Products Liability
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rights of nonusers under the doctrine of strict liability are still
somewhat unclear.
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ex-
pressly includes only "users" and "consumers" within its pro-
tective ambit. In a caveat the drafters express no opinion "as
to whether the rules stated in this Section may not apply...
to harm to persons other than users or consumers ... ,116 The
"user or consumer" limitation, a vestige of the old privity re-
quirement,"7 has been criticized by some commentators," 8 and
despite the Restatement's lack of encouragement, most cases
decided in the past decade have favored extending the scope
of strict liability to nonusers."' Today, at least 11 states permit
nonusers to recover under the strict liability doctrine. 20
Cases, 2 CREIGHTON L. REV. 295, 296-305 (1969). Section 2-318, as first drafted in 1951,
provided that the seller's warranty extended to "any natural person who is in the
family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to
expect that such a person may use, consume, or be affected by the goods." In 1966 the
drafters proposed two additional alternatives. Alternative B expanded protection to
any "natural person," and alternative C extended coverage to injuries beyond those
to the person that might result from the seller's breach of warranty. See Jentz, Exten-
sion of Strict Liability to All Third Persons, 12 AM. Bus. L.J. 231, 242 (1975). Kentucky
has retained the original version, alternative A. KRS § 355.2-318. Therefore, a suit for
damages by a non-user under a theory of implied warranty might fail for lack of privity
with the seller.
HI6 Casual bystanders and others who may come in contact with the
product, as in the case of employees of the retailer, a passer-by injured by
an exploding bottle, or a pedestrian hit by an automobile, have been denied
recovery. There may be no essential reason why such plaintiffs should not
be brought within the scope of the protection afforded, other than that they
do not have the same reasons for expecting such protection as the consumer
who buys a marketed product; but the social pressure which has been largely
responsible for the development of the rule stated has been a consumers'
pressure, and there is not the same demand for the protection of casual
strangers.
RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment o (1965).
"' See Comment, Cave Adstantem: Bystander Recovery in Products Liability
Cases, 2 CREIGtrrON L. REV. 295, 318 (1969).
"' See, e.g., Jentz, Extension of Strict Liability to All Third Persons, 12 AM. Bus.
L.J. 231, 241 (1975).
"' Although Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc. did not involve injury to a
nonuser, the California Supreme Court anticipated this trend by setting forth a broad
rule of liability: "A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on
the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have
a defect that causes injury to a human being." 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697,
700 (1963) (emphasis added).
I See Comment, Misuse as a Bar to Bystander Recovery Under Strict Products
Liability, 10 HoUSTON L. REv. 1106, 1115 (1973).
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Strict liability was first applied to a nonuser in the 1965
Michigan case, Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 21 in which
the plaintiff was injured when a defective shell caused his
brother's shotgun barrel to explode. Although the court spoke
in terms of warranty, its rationale was based more on strict
liability principles.' 2  A similar result was reached that same
year by a Connecticut court in Mitchell v. Miller. 12 The leading
case, however, is Elmore v. American Motors Corp.,124 a 1969
California decision involving a plaintiff who was injured when
his vehicle was struck by an automobile manufactured and sold
by the defendants. The collision occurred when the other vehi-
cle went out of control because of a defectively connected drive
shaft. The lower court nonsuited the plaintiffs, but the Califor-
nia Supreme Court reversed, holding that a nonuser could
bring an action based on strict liability in tort against both the
manufacturer and the seller of a defective automobile:
An automobile with a defectively connected drive shaft con-
stituted a substantial hazard on the highway not only to the
driver and passenger of the car but also to pedestrians and
other drivers. The public policy which protects the driver and
passenger of the car should also protect the bystander, and
where a driver or passenger of another car is injured due to
defects in the manufacture of an automobile and without any
fault of their own, they may recover from the manufacturer
of the defective automobile.'25
The Kentucky Court of Appeals first allowed recovery
under a theory of strict tort liability in Dealers Transport Co.
v. Battery Distributing Co. 6 and has since applied strict liabil-
ity in a number of products liability cases.'27 Prior to Embs,
121 133 N.W.2d 129 (Mich. 1965). See 25 MD. L. REV. 267 (1965); 41 WASH. L. REV.
161 (1966).
In See Comment, Bystander's Liberation Front-UCC § 2-318 or Strict Liability?
19 KAN. L. REV. 251, 257 (1971).
12 214 A.2d 694 (Conn. Super Ct. 1965).
124 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969). See 38 FORDHAM L. REv. 579 (1970).
'2 451 P.2d at 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
1- 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965). This case is discussed in Kentucky Court of Appeals
Review: Torts, 55 Ky. L.J. 453, 472-73 (1967).
'2 See, e.g., Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg. Co., 502 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. 1973); Post v.
American Cleaning Equip. Corp., 437 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. 1968); Kroger Co. v. Bowman,
411 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1967). See also Comment, Products Liability: Is § 402A Strict
Liability Really Strict in Kentucky?, 62 Ky. L.J. 866, 869-73 (1974).
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however, the issue of a manufacturer's liability to nonusers had
arisen only twice in this state. The first case, Davidson v.
Leadingham,2 1 was decided by a federal district court in 1968.
Davidson arose out of an automobile accident caused by a de-
fect in a truck manufactured by one of the defendants. The
federal court, applying Kentucky law in a diversity action, re-
fused to allow the suit to proceed on a strict liability basis
because it was unwilling to extend the scope of strict liability
beyond that which had been established by existing Kentucky
decisions.'
29
The second case was Ford Motor Co. v. Zipper,'3 a 1973
decision in which the plaintiff was struck from behind by an
automobile driven by one of the defendants. The plaintiff
brought suit on a strict liability theory against the driver, the
retail seller and the manufacturer of the vehicle. At trial it was
established that the accident had occurred when the brakes on
the defendant's car failed as the result of a manufacturing
defect. Although judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed on
appeal, the Court did not discuss the victim's nonuser status.'3 '
Nevertheless, the result in Zipper suggested that the Court of
Appeals would permit nonusers to recover on a strict liability
theory.
The Court permitted just such a recovery in Embs v.
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. In Embs the plaintiff was injured by
flying glass when a soft-drink exploded near her while she was
shopping in a self-service retail store. She brought suit under
strict liability, but the trial court directed a verdict for the
defendants. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that manu-
facturers and sellers of defective products are strictly liable in
tort for injuries caused by such products, even though the vic-
tim may be a "nonuser." Thus, Kentucky has joined the grow-
ing number of jurisdictions which permit nonusers to recover
lZ' 294 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Ky. 1968).
,2' A similar result was reached by a federal district court in New York. See Mull
v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), affd, Mull v. Ford Motor Co., 368 F.2d
713 (2d Cir. 1966). The Mull case was cited with approval by the federal court in
Davidson, 294 F. Supp. at 157.
' 502 S.W.2d 74 (Ky. 1973).
, The Zipper case was discussed in Ausness, Kentucky Law Survey: Torts, 63 Ky.
L.J. 766-67 (1975).
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against manufacturers under strict liability for injuries caused
by defective products.
The imposition of strict liability for injuries caused by
defective products is usually justified by a concept known as
"enterprise liability," which provides that a product's social
costs, including personal injuries, should be treated as a cost
of production and placed on the manufacturer or seller rather
than on the victim. 13 2 Enterprise liability is premised on the
dual considerations of loss spreading and efficiency.133 Al-
though criticized by some commentators,' 34 the loss spreading
rationale is the most popular justification for the imposition of
strict liability.' 35 Losses caused by defective products are
shifted to the manufacturer, because he can minimize their
economic impact by spreading them over a large number of
persons.13 The manufacturer may either absorb the loss di-
rectly or insure against it; in either event the additional cost
can be spread among the purchasers of the product through
higher prices.
137
"I See James, Social Insurance and Tort Liability, 27 N.Y.U.L. REv. 537 (1952);
Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172 (1952);
Note, The Expanding Scope of Enterprise Liability, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1084 (1969).
"5 See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499, 500-01 (1961).
" There are three major objections: First, in some cases the manufacturer may
not be the best risk spreader. See Smyser, Products Liability and the American Law
Institute: A Petition for Rehearing, 42 U. DEr. L.J. 343, 349-50 (1965). Second, risk
spreading by manufacturers may result in higher prices and decreased production,
thus denying the product to some consumers, particularly the poor. See McKean,
Products Liability: Trends and Implications, 38 U. CHi. L. REV. 3, 50 (1971); Plant,
Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-An
Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REV. 938, 946-47 (1957). Finally, social insurance is a
better means of risk spreading than tort law. See Peairs, The God in the Machine, 29
B.U.L. REV. 37, 77 (1949). But see G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 43-44 (1970).
"I See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 703
(1962); Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944); Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 81 (N.J. 1960); James, General Prod-
ucts-Should Manufacturers be Liable Without Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REv. 923
(1957); Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Towards Strict Liability, 24 TENN.
L. REV. 963, 1010, 1017 (1957).
"I See Note, Strict Products Liability to the Bystander: A Study in Common Law
Determinism, 38 U. CHi. L. REV. 625, 636 (1971).
" The manufacturer may also pass part of the cost back to production factors,
such as labor or the suppliers of raw materials. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk
Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 519-27 (1961).
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Considerations of efficiency may also support a strict lia-
bility rule which places liability on manufacturers. 3 ' According
to this theory, losses caused by defective products should be
placed upon the party who can most easily reduce or prevent
them. 131 This is usually the manufacturer or seller, rather than
the user or victim 40
Both loss spreading and economic efficiency objectives
appear to favor an extension of manufacturer liability to non-
users. To the extent that loss spreading arguments support
strict liability for users, they apply with equal force to nonu-
sers. "' As the federal court in Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc. 1
2
declared: "[B]ystanders as a class would not generally be bet-
ter able to bear the loss than users or consumers.""' Moreover,
nonusers are less likely than consumers to insure against injury
on a first party basis."'
The protection of nonusers is also consistent with cost
avoidance and efficiency goals. Clearly, the nonuser is no better
able than the consumer to avoid injury from product defects.
As the Elmore court noted, since a bystander is not a purchaser
or user, he cannot exercise care in the selection or use of the
product.14 5 Therefore, if the imposition of strict liability upon
manufacturers is justifiable on the ground that producers can
reduce accident costs from defective products less expensively
or more efficiently than can consumers, this same principle will
support a liability rule that also protects nonusers.
I See McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Implications, 38 U. CHi. L.
REV. 3, 24-57 (1970).
" See Calabresi & Bass, Right Approach, Wrong Implications: A Critique of
McKean on Products Liability, 38 U. CHI. L, REV. 74, 76-89 (1970).
"I See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE
L.J. 1055, 1071-72 (1972). But see Buchanan, In Defense of Caveat Emptor, 38 U. CH.
L. REV. 64, 67-70 (1970).
"I See Note, Strict Products Liability to the Bystander: A Study in Common Law
Determinism, 38 U. CHt. L. REV. 625, 638 (1971).
4 296 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969).
" Id. at 781.
See Note, Strict Products Liability and the Bystander, 64 CoLUMb. L. REV. 916,
935 (1964).
"I "[Consumers] have the opportunity to inspect for defects and to limit their
purchases to articles manufactured by reputable manufacturers and sold by reputable
retailers, whereas the bystander ordinarily has no such opportunities." Elmore v.
American Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 657 (1969).
1975]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
It is clear that both loss spreading and economic efficiency
goals influenced the Court's decision in the Embs case. After
noting that "public policy demands that the burden of acciden-
tal injuries caused by products intended for consumption be
placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost
of production against which liability insurance can be ob-
tained," ' the Court described how these considerations af-
fected a manufacturer's liability to nonusers:
Our expressed public policy will be furthered if we minimize
the risk of personal injury and property damage by charging
the cost of injuries against the manufacturer who can procure
liability insurance and distribute its expense among the pub-
lic as a cost of doing business; and since the risk of harm from
defective products exists for mere bystanders and passersby
as well as for the purchaser or user, there is no substantial
reason for protecting one class of persons and not the other.'7
The Court of Appeals also discussed the issue of retailer liabil-
ity in Embs. California, which decided the landmark
Greenman and Elmore cases, was likewise the first state to
extend strict liability to retailers;"' most strict liability juris-
dictions, including Kentucky,' 9 immediately followed.'50
Caruth v. Marini,'1 a 1970 Arizona case, was perhaps the earli-
est decision to impose strict liability upon retailers for injuries
to nonusers. In Embs the Kentucky Court, relying upon
Caruth, held that strict liability would extend to retail sellers
as well as manufacturers, a decision which it justified with the
risk spreading rationale discussed earlier:
As a matter of public policy the retailer or middleman as well
as the manufacturer should be liable since the loss for injuries
resulting from defective products should be placed on those
, 528 S.W.2d at 705. See also RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment c (1965).
" 528 S.W.2d at 705.
"' Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 319 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
1 See Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965).
' See, e.g., Housman v. C.A. Dawson & Co., 245 N.E.2d 886 (Il. Ct. App. 1969);
Browne v. Fenestra, Inc., 134 N.W.2d 730 (Mich. 1965). See also RESTATEIENT § 402A,
commentf at 350 (1965); Lauscher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The
Road To and Past Vandermark, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 30 (1965); Prosser, The Fall of the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 816 (1966); Com-
ment, Tort-Strict Liability for Retailers?, 45 WASH. L. REv. 431, 433 (1970).
1' 463 P.2d 83 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970).
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members of the marketing chain best able to pay the loss,
who can then distribute such a risk among themselves by
means of insurance and indemnity agreements.'52
Finally, the Court in Embs imposed a "reasonably foresee-
able" limitation on the strict liability doctrine, declaring:
"Public policy is adequately served if parameters are placed
upon the extension of the rule so that it is limited to bystanders
whose injury from the defect is reasonably foreseeable."', 3
Strict liability, of course, has never meant that the manufac-
turer is regarded as a general insurer for the victim no matter
how or where he comes to grief,' 4 and the Restatement's "user
or consumer" limitation was probably intended to delimit the
class of persons to whom the manufacturer would be liable.'55
Once manufacturers' liability for defective products was ex-
tended to include nonusers, however, the problem of limiting
liability became more significant. Presently, two approaches
are in general use: the "any person" test and the "foreseeabil-
ity" standard. Although the foreseeability criterion appears to
be the prevailing rule, '56 it has been criticized as less consistent
with the loss spreading objectives of enterprise liability than
the broader "any person" approach.'-"
The application of strict liability in tort to manufacturers
and retailers on behalf of nonusers is consistent with the pre-
vailing trend in American products liability law. Moreover,
this extension of liability appears fully justified by the public
policy considerations discussed earlier. Therefore, the Court in
"1 528 S.W.2d at 706.
15 Id.
'- See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE
L.J. 1055, 1056 (1972).
'0 See Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 860 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968).
"I See Mitchell v. Miller, 214 A.2d 694 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1965); Elmore v. Ameri-
can Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969); Piercefield v. Remington Arms
Co., 133 N.W.2d 129 (Mich. 1965); cf. UCC § 2-318 where the victim is protected only
"if it is reasonable to expect that such person may ... be affected by the goods." Noel,
Defective Products: Extension of Strict Liability to Bystanders, 38 TENN. L. REV. 1,
12 (1970). The broader "any person" test was favorably reviewed in Sills v. Massey-
Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776, 781 (N.D. Ind. 1969).
'"I See Howes v. Hansen, 201 N.W.2d 825, 831 (Wis. 1972); Jentz, Extension of
Strict Liability to All Third Persons, 12 ArM. Bus. L.J. 231, 243-45 (1975).
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Embs v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. reached the correct decision
and did so for the right reasons.
III. NUISANCE
The difference between a public and private nuisance does
not lie in the nature of the nuisance itself, but rather in the
scope of its injurious effect.'58 A public nuisance affects the
public at large, or those members of the public who come into
contact with it, while a private nuisance affects only a limited
number of individuals. A nuisance may be characterized as
both public and private, when public as well as individual
interests are wrongfully invaded.'59
In City of Monticello v. Rankin,'0 a number of property
owners sought injunctive relief against the continued operation
of a nearby sewage disposal plant owned by the city.'"' The
plaintiffs alleged that the operation of the plant constituted a
nuisance because it emitted offensive odors and interfered with
the use and enjoyment of their homes and adjacent premises.
The trial court found that a properly constructed and main-
tained sewage disposal plant would not create unpleasant
odors, and that the city had made no attempt to alleviate the
problem. Consequently, the lower court held in favor of the
plaintiffs, ruling that unless the nuisance was abated within
seven months, further operation of the sewage disposal plant
would be enjoined. On appeal, the defendant argued that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to bring abatement proceedings.
A common or public nuisance is an act or omission that
injuriously affects the safety, health or morals of the public, or
works some substantial annoyance, inconvenience or injury to
the public.'82 The maintenance of a public nuisance is a crimi-
," See W. G. Duncan Coal Co. v. Jones, 254 S.W.2d 720 (Ky. 1953).
'' See, e.g., Hill v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 109 N.W.2d 749 (Minn. 1961); Costas
v. Fond du Lac, 129 N.W.2d 217 (Wis. 1964).
521 S.W.2d 79 (Ky. 1975).
'e, It is a generally recognized exception to the rule of sovereign immunity that
an injunction will lie against a governmental body for creating or maintaining a nuis-
ance. See 58 Am. JUR.2d Nuisances § 55 (1971). Moreover, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity has been abrogated in Kentucky with respect to municipalities.
HI See Commonwealth v. South Covington & Cent. St. Ry. Co., 205 S.W. 581, 583
(Ky. 1918); cf. RESTATEMENT § 821B (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
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nal offense.1 3 In addition, the state, through its attorney gen-
eral or other authorized official, can maintain a suit in equity
to abate a public nuisance.'64 Although the power to sue for
abatement of a public nuisance is sometimes conferred on indi-
viduals by statute,'65 normally, a private individual may main-
tain a civil action in tort only when he suffers special damage,
different in kind from that suffered by the general public.'66
The special damage, however, need not be peculiar, exclusive
or unique to the plaintiff, and the fact that other individuals
suffer the same kind of damage does not prevent any of them
from recovering under a public nuisance theory. 1 7
The special damage rule is satisfied if a public nuisance
affects the use and enjoyment of an individual's land. The
property owner's damages are "special" because each tract of
land is considered unique in the eyes of the law. Furthermore,
in most cases only a limited number of landowners will be
affected by the nuisance, and their interest will be different
from that of the general public. Accordingly, in City of Monti-
cello v. Rankin the Court of Appeals allowed the plaintiffs to
'1 See Kentucky Glycerine Co. v. Commonwealth, 224 S.W. 360 (Ky. 1920); Com-
monwealth v. Beals, 119 S.W. 813 (Ky. 1909); 58 AM. JuR.2d Nuisance § 186 (1971).
"I See Hancock v. Terry Elkhorn Mining Co., 503 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. 1973); Aus-
ness, Kentucky Law Survey: Torts, 63 Ky. L.J. 753, 767-71 (1975).
"I See Pompano Horse Club v. State, 111 So. 801 (Fla. 1927); 58 Aht. Jua.2d
Nuisance § 112 (1971).
'" See Embry-Bosse Funeral Home, Inc. v. Webster, 261 S.W.2d 682 (Ky. 1953);
Polk v. Axton, 208 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1948); York v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 41
S.W.2d 668 (Ky. 1931); Alsip v. Hodge, 283 S.W. 392 (Ky. 1926). The historical devel-
opment of the special damages rule is discussed in Newark, The Boundaries of
Nuisance, 65 L.Q. REv. 480 (1949). The special damages limitation is based on a policy
of preventing a multiplicity of suits. See William's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 163 (K.B. 1592);
Comment, Public Nuisance Standing to Sue without Showing "Special Inquiry," 26
U. FLA. L. REv. 360, 361 (1974). But this construction has been criticized: Jurgens-
meyer, Control of Air Pollution Through the Assertion of Private Rights, 1967 DUKE
L.J. 2126, 2234-35; Smith, Private Action for Obstruction of Public Right of Passage,
15 COLULM L. REv. 1, 15-23 (1915). But see Save Sand Key, Inc. v. United States Steel
Corp., 281 So.2d 572 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973); RESTATEMENT § 821C(2) (c) (Tent. Draft No.
17, 1971). Moreover, the special damages requirement is not confined to actions for
damages, but is also applied to cases where a private individual seeks an injunction,
Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 1006 (1966), or even
abatement of a nuisance by self-help. See Ehrlick v. Commonwealth, 102 S.W. 289
(Ky. 1907); RESTATEMENT § 203(2).
I" See Seifried v. Hays, 81 Ky. 377 (1883); RESTATEMENT § 821C (Tent. Draft No.
16, 1970).
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maintain an action in public nuisance against the city. The
Court further declared that the defendant's operation of its
sewage disposal plant constituted a private nuisance:
It is also generally recognized, however, that where there is
any substantial interference with the plaintiffs use and en-
joyment of his own land, this makes the nuisance a private
as well as a public one, and since the plaintiff does not lose
his rights as a land owner merely because others suffer dam-
age of the same kind, or even of the same degree, there is
general agreement that he may proceed upon either theory,
or upon both.' 8
Liability is imposed for a private nuisance if one party
unreasonably interferes with the property rights of another."9
This usually involves two aspects: (1) Defining the nature of
the protected property interest, and (2) determining the rea-
sonableness of the defendant's conduct. 70 The interest pro-
tected is the right to reasonable comfort and convenience in the
occupation of one's land.171 Once an invasion is established,
17 2
the defendant will be held liable if his conduct is deemed un-
reasonable. According to the Restatement of Torts, any inten-
tional invasion is considered unreasonable, "unless the utility
of the actor's conduct outweighs the gravity of the harm.'
' 73
Factors that affect the gravity of the harm are its extent and
character, the suitability of the invaded interest and the bur-
den on the injured party to avoid harm. 74 These factors must
be balanced against the social value of the invading conduct,
its suitability to the locality and the ease by which it may be
modified to prevent the harm. 75 The Restatement's balancing
" 521 S.W.2d at 80-81.
"' See Adams v. Hamilton Carhartt Overall Co., 169 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1943);
Kentucky-Ohio Gas Co. v. Bowling, 95 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1936); Petroleum Ref. Co. v.
Commonwealth, 232 S.W. 421 (Ky. 1921).
"0' See Note, An Economic Analysis of Land Use Conflicts, 21 STN. L. REv. 293
(1969).
7 See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 89 (4th ed. 1971).
,72 The plaintiff must suffer "substantial harm" to be entitled to relief. See id. at
§ 87; RESTATEMENT § 821F (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970).
' Id. at § 826.
"' See RESTATEMENT § 827 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
' Id. at § 828.
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approach is now the law in Kentucky,176 having been adopted
and endorsed by the Court of Appeals in Louisville Refining
Co. v. Mudd:"
[T]he existence of a nuisance must be ascertained on the
basis of two broad factors, neither of which may in any case
be the sole test to the exclusion of the other; (1) the reasona-
bleness of the defendant's use of his property, and (2) the
gravity of harm to the complainant. Both are to be considered
in light of all the circumstances of the case, including the
lawful nature and location of the defendant's business, the
manner of its operation, and such importance to the com-
munity as it may have; the kind, volume, time and duration
of the particular annoyance; the respective situations of the
parties; and the character (including applicable zoning) of
the locality.' 
7
In weighing the utility of the defendant's conduct against
the gravity of the harm, the Court in Rankin undoubtedly
thought that the odor problem could have been largely pre-
vented by proper operation of the plant. Citing Louisville &
Jefferson County Air Board v. Porter,179 the city argued that an
activity which would constitute a nuisance if conducted for
private gain might not necessarily be considered a nuisance
when conducted for an important public purpose. The Court
admitted the general validity of this proposition, but denied its
applicability to the facts in the Rankin case. Although the
public benefits of a sewage disposal plant might in some in-
stances outweigh unavoidable harm to nearby landowners, the
adverse effects in this case were avoidable and unnecessary. 8 '
The choice, therefore, was not between a plant or no plant, but
between a properly operated plant and an improperly operated
facility. An improperly operated sewage disposal plant has no
particular social utility, regardless of whether it is publicly or
privately owned, and the Court quite properly refused to allow
the city to rely on the public character of the operation as a
,,1 For a discussion of the two conflicting lines of nuisance cases in Kentucky prior
to 1960, see note, 50 Ky. L.J. 104 (1961).
'" 339 S.W.2d 181 (Ky. 1960).
"I Id. at 186-87.
1" 397 S.W.2d 146, 150 (Ky. 1965).
11 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 830 (1939).
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means of avoiding liability.
Another issue in the Rankin case was the nature of the
relief granted to the plaintiffs. The lower court allowed the city
approximately seven months to abate the nuisance and di-
rected that the plant be closed if the harmful conditions were
not remedied by that time. On appeal, the city urged the Court
to apply the balance of convenience doctrine' 1 and limit the
plaintiff's relief to an award of damages. However, denial of
injunctive relief under the balance of convenience doctrine is
appropriate only where the total damage to the plaintiff's prop-
erty is small in comparison with the harm to the defendant if
an injunction is granted.'8 2 This was not the case in Rankin, for
the injunction merely required the city to operate the plant
properly, a comparatively light burden in relation to the harm
that would otherwise result. Therefore, the Court rejected the
city's argument.
The decision in Rankin seems doctrinally sound. The de-
fendant's conduct was certainly tortious under the balancing
test of Louisville Refining Co. v. Mudd. Moreover, the plain-
tiffs were entitled to an injunction, since the continuing unrea-
sonable interference with the use and enjoyment of their land
could not be adequately compensated by damages at law,'
and the balance of convenience doctrine was inapplicable.
Economic analysis adds an interesting dimension to the
Rankin case.' 4 If we accept the proposition that the law of
nuisance should promote an efficient allocation of resources, we
may ask whether Rankin achieved this objective. In economic
terms the objectionable odors may be characterized as a nega-
tive externality. If we assume that the benefits of having a
,"I The balance of convenience doctrine is discussed in Note, Nuisance Abate-
ment: Use of the Comparative Injury Doctrine, 1971 URBAN L. ANN. 206; Note, 22 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 356 (1971); Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 601 (1971).
182 See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
,S See Maloney, Judicial Protection of the Environment: A New Role for
Common-Law Remedies, 25 VAND. L. REV. 145, 147 (1972).
28 See Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines
as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cm. L. REV. 681, 722-28 (1973); Note, An Economic
Analysis of Land Use Conflicts, 21 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1969). See also Calabresi &
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1115-24 (1974); Michaelman, Pollution as a Tort: A
Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's Costs, 80 YALE L.J. 647 (1971).
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sewage disposal plant in this particular location outweigh the
harm to nearby property owners, a decision to close the plant
in order to protect the property owners would be inappropriate.
However, if liability is placed on the city, it should be able,
theoretically, to internalize the costs of compensating the prop-
erty owners for their losses, while still continuing to operate.' 5
An award of permanent damages would be sufficient to accom-
plish this, and injunctive relief would not be necessary.
However, Rankin did not involve an "either-or" situation.
The trial court concluded that the city could eliminate, or at
least greatly reduce, the harm it caused the plaintiffs by modi-
fying the manner in which the plant was operated. If the costs
of modifying its behavior are demonstrably less than the plain-
tiff's damages, then the defendant should be compelled to
modify its behavior accordingly. The form of relief decreed was
calculated to do just that,'86 and the most efficient resolution
of the conflict was thereby achieved. Thus, Rankin seems cor-
rectly decided on both doctrinal and policy grounds.
"I Professor Coase has argued that an efficient result would occur regardless of
where the liability was initially imposed, provided that there are no significant trans-
action costs. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). See also
Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment,
11 J. LAW & EcoN. 67 (1968); Nutter, The Coase Theorem on Social Cost: A Footnote,
11 J. LAW & ECON. 504 (1968). After a decade and a half, the Coase Theorem remains
controversial and was recently the subject of a two-issue symposium in the Natural
Resources Journal. See Symposium, 13 NAT. RES. J. 557-716 (1973); 14 NAT. REs. J. 1-
86 (1974). This implies that when there are significant bargaining and administrative
costs, as in the case of multiple parties, it does make a difference on whom the liability
is placed. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabil-
ity: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1094-98 (1972). If the Court
had placed the liability on the landowners, i.e., if it had found that there was no
nuisance, it is doubtful that the landowners could have "bribed" the city to operate
the disposal plant properly, even though this was clearly the most efficient course of
action from a societal point of view.
'"I Once its liability was established, the city might have been willing to abate the
nuisance in order to avoid paying damages to the plaintiffs, since by hypothesis this
would be the less expensive course of action. However, since governmental institutions
are not always responsive to economic pressures, the more direct approach seems
preferable under the circumstances.
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